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A Sensitive Virtue Epistemology 
 
We offer an alternative to two influential accounts of virtue epistemology: Robust Virtue 
Epistemology (RVE) and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE). We argue that while 
traditional RVE does offer an explanation of the distinctive value of knowledge, it is unable 
to effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck; and while ALVE does effectively deal with 
cases of epistemic luck, it lacks RVE’s resources to account for the distinctive value of 
knowledge. The account we provide, however, is both robustly virtue-theoretic and anti-luck, 
having the respective benefits of both rival accounts without their respective shortcomings. 
We describe this view here. 
 
 Keywords: virtue epistemology, anti-luck epistemology, sensitivity condition 
 
1  Overview 
 
Recent work in value epistemology has offered two influential accounts of the value 
of knowledge: Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology 
(ALVE). Central to these accounts is the attempt to discover whether knowledge has, for 
example, a distinctive value over other cognitive states such as mere true belief. One reason 
for the recent value turn in epistemology is the recognition that merely providing an analysis 
of knowledge is incomplete. A more robust epistemology would, in theory, tell us not only 
		
what knowledge is, but why obtaining that knowledge is something we ought to value (over 
and above other cognitive states). Call the attempt to account for the distinctive value of 
knowledge the value problem. 
Despite recent interest in the value problem, providing a robust account of the 
value of knowledge has proved elusive. We argue that there are two primary reasons for this 
failure. First, attempts to account for the distinctive value of knowledge have failed to 
adequately deal with cases of knowledge-undermining luck. Second, and in response to the 
failure noted above, anti-luck accounts which do account for knowledge-undermining luck 
in return fail to account for the distinctive value of knowledge. Our account, it is argued, 
avoids these pitfalls and is both robustly virtue-theoretic (and can thus account for the 
distinctive value of knowledge) and has resources for ruling out knowledge-undermining 
luck. Before providing the details of the account, it will be important to understand exactly 
what Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) 
claim with regard to the value problem. We begin by considering RVE. 
Central to RVE’s account of the value of knowledge is the claim that knowledge is a 
kind of success from ability—it is, in other words, an achievement. The 
Knowledge-as-Achievement (KA) thesis explains, in an elegant and straightforward manner, 
that the distinctive value of knowledge is to be accounted for by the distinctive sort of 
achievement associated with knowledge. It’s an achievement where the success comes from 
the ability of the agent and is distinctive from other kinds of successes where luck could 
play a contributing role. Put simply, here is the argument:  
 1. Achievements are finally valuable. 
2. Knowledge is a kind of achievement. 
		
Therefore, 
3. Knowledge is finally valuable.1  
 
 Three things should be noted about this argument. First, the kind of value 
associated with knowledge is said to be final value. While we won’t discuss the various 
differences related to value here, final value has non-instrumental value. Though similar to 
intrinsic value in this regard, final value is distinct from intrinsic value in that it allows for its 
value to come from some external property. In other words, something is said to be finally 
valuable because of its relational properties and not merely because of its internal 
properties. In the case of knowledge, then, its value comes from its relationship to 
something else valuable—namely, achievements. Second, this argument is also meant to 
answer a wide variety of value problems, including what Duncan Pritchard calls the tertiary 
value problem— the tertiary value problem being concerned with the distinctive value of 
knowledge (more on this below). Finally, there is a more general point about this argument 
that shouldn’t be overlooked. Robust virtue epistemologists (RVEs) analyse knowledge in 
terms of achievements gained through the exercise of cognitive abilities and claim, 
moreover, that an analysis of this sort is sufficient for knowledge, absent an independent 
anti-luck condition. Only RVEs can make use of the KA thesis to explain the distinctive 
value of knowledge for the following reasons. If the relevant kind of cognitive achievement 
is not sufficient for knowledge then there will be cases in which an agent can have this sort of 
achievement without having knowledge. If so, there will be cognitive states which fall short 
																																																						
1	 See	Greco	(2011,	229-230).	As	a	note,	our	analysis	of	knowledge	is	concerned	with	only	empirical	and	contingent	truths.	In	the	
literature,	there	is	a	worry	that	safety	and	sensitivity	conditions	cannot	account	for	epistemic	luck	in	the	case	of	necessary	truths.	
We	want	to	avoid	this	lengthy	discussion	here	and	thus	limit	our	claim	to	empirical	and	contingent	truths.	In	saying	this,	though,	we	
do	think	sensitivity	can	be	naturally	modified	to	deal	with	necessary	truths.	See	[reference	suppressed] 
		
of knowledge but which are also an achievement of this sort; the result being that this sort 
of achievement cannot account for the distinctive value of knowledge.2 Making use of the 
KA thesis to explain the distinctive value of knowledge then requires taking the kind of 
cognitive achievement at hand to be sufficient for knowledge. But this is just what it is to be 
an RVE. The availability of this explanation of the distinctive value of knowledge is taken to 
be an advantage of RVE over ‘modest’ virtue epistemologies such as ALVE, which take 
cognitive achievement to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge.3 
So what exactly is wrong with RVE? To begin, there is a worry concerning the first 
premise, especially as it relates to the value of easy or wicked achievements. Are wicked 
achievements, such as those perpetrated by an evil mastermind, really valuable? While this 
question certainly deserves more attention, it is not one we will consider here.4 Instead, our 
focus is premise 2—the KA thesis. The main problem with the KA thesis, as noted by 
Pritchard, is that there seem to be cases of cognitive achievements that do not amount to 
knowledge. If this criticism is successful, then RVE cannot account for the distinctive value 
of knowledge. The details of this argument are spelled out below, but we can note now that 
Barney-type cases are typical examples where agents seem to meet all the necessary 
conditions for a genuine cognitive achievement and yet lack knowledge given the element 
of luck that is involved. The issue for RVE, then, is that it lacks sufficient anti-luck 
resources to deal with Barney-type cases. The result, Pritchard argues, is that RVE needs to 
adopt an independent anti-luck condition and abandon the claim that all knowledge is 
distinctively valuable. Pritchard of course offers an account that does precisely this in his 
																																																						
2	 This,	then,	is	the	tertiary	value	problem. 
3	 That	RVE	has	these	unique	resources	for	explaining	the	distinctive	value	of	knowledge	is	a	point	that	modest	virtue	
epistemologists	have	conceded.	See	(e.g.)	Pritchard	(2012)	and	Kallestrup	and	Pritchard	(2012). 
4	 For	a	discussion	on	this	problem	see	Pritchard	(2009,	5). 
		
"Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology."5 We argue here, however, that the criticisms offered by 
Pritchard do not require an independent anti-luck condition nor do these criticisms require 
a weakening of the relationship between achievements and knowledge. The advantage of 
our account is that it maintains the respective benefits of both rival accounts without their 
respective shortcomings. In other words, it is both robustly virtue-theoretic and anti-luck. 
In order to see this, let’s start by assessing Pritchard’s claim that RVE fails to 
account for the distinctive value of knowledge on the grounds that there are cognitive 
achievements that do not amount to knowledge. 6 He illustrates the problem with two 
examples: 
 
 Archie: Archie is a skilled archer who, under normal conditions, successfully hits 
the target at which he aims. The goal in question is successful because of the ability 
of Archie. This counts as a genuine achievement. However, on Archie’s next shot 
things are slightly different. Archie selects his target and successfully hits the target 
because of his skill. Yet, while Archie is successful because of his ability, he is 
unaware that there are force fields around all the other targets. This means, then, 
had he selected any other target he would have failed in his goal.  
 
 Barney: Barney, unknowingly, is driving through barn façade county. In barn façade 
county all the barns are made to look like actual barns. Barney, however, happens to 
see the one barn in barn façade county that is an actual barn. Thus, Barney forms 
the true belief that he has seen a genuine barn.  
																																																						
5	 See	Pritchard	(2012). 
6	 See	Pritchard	(2010,	50). 
		
 
 The Archie and Barney cases are thought to be relevantly analogous: if one accepts 
that there is a genuine achievement in the Archie case then one must also accept that there 
is a genuine (cognitive) achievement in the Barney case. If these cases are indeed analogous, 
then it will not be the case that knowledge has distinctive value over that which falls short 
of knowledge. One purported solution, offered by John Greco, is to resist the analogy 
(2011, 229). Greco argues that the Barney case does not represent success from ability and 
is therefore not a genuine achievement. Greco conceives of abilities as 
environment-relative: in barn façade county, Barney doesn’t have the ability to distinguish a 
fake barn from a real barn; as a result, Greco claims, his success in barn façade county is not 
from ability. 
Greco’s initial response to these Barney-type cases has generated some serious 
criticisms7 and, as a result, he now offers an updated explanation of environment-relative 
abilities.8  In the updated account Greco still rejects the explicit introduction of modal 
conditions and maintains that Barney-type cases do not represent genuine achievements. 
The updated account, however, now appeals to the exercise of intellectual abilities that 
serve relevant informational needs, where information is needed to enable felicitous action 
in practical environments. Greco’s analysis can be summed as follows:  
 S knows that p iff: 
 
 
1.  S’s believing that p is produced by an intellectual ability of the relevant 
																																																						
7	 See	Pritchard	(2010,	34-40). 
8	 Greco	(2013).	  
		
sort, i.e. of a sort defined by parameters that would serve relevant 
informational needs; 
 
        2.  S is in conditions relevant for the exercise of that ability; and 
 
3.  S has a true belief because S’s belief is produced by an ability of the 
relevant sort, while in relevant conditions.  
Greco’s new analysis makes essential use of the notion of actual or potential practical 
environments. In particular the ‘relevant sort’ of intellectual ability is one that serves 
informational needs—viz. furnishes the agent with information that allows her to achieve 
her practical aims—in conditions relevant for the exercise of that ability. Abilities, then, are 
still environment-relative in Greco’s new account. 
Even with this updated analysis, however, it’s still not clear if Greco’s account is 
sufficiently anti-luck (an issue we deal with in more detail below). Another worry is how, on 
Greco’s account, one can, in a non-circular way, pick out the relevant environment. Here is 
how the problem arises: objective probabilities can only be specified relative to a reference 
class and any given event belongs to various different reference classes.9 Thus, specifying 
the probability of that event involves first choosing a privileged reference class. If the 
probability that a car will break down is to be estimated, one must first decide whether to 
appeal to the frequency of cars breaking down, the frequency of this particular make of car 
breaking down, the frequency of this particular model of car breaking down, and so on.10 In 
																																																						
9	 See	Venn	(1876)	and	Reichenbach	(1949). 
10	 Reichenbach	summarizes	the	role	of	reference	classes	in	assessing	probabilities:	
	
If	we	are	asked	to	find	the	probability	holding	for	an	individual	future	event,	we	must	first	incorporate	the	case	into	a	suitable	
		
the present case, the probability that informational needs will be served requires first 
deciding what area around the agent is specially privileged to count as her environment. 
Brandom develops this point with respect to pure reliabilist theories of knowledge, but it is 
easy to see how the problem carries over to Greco’s analysis: 
 [S]uppose that Barn Facade County is one of a hundred counties in the state, all 
the rest of which eschew facades in favor of actual barns. Then ... within the state rather 
than within the county, our subject’s process of perceptual belief formation may be quite 
reliable ... But then, if the whole country, consisting of fifty larger states, shares the habits of 
Barn Facade County—so that over the whole country (excepting this one state) facades 
predominate by a large margin—then considered as a capacity exercised in the country, the 
very same capacity will count as quite unreliable, and hence as insufficient to underwrite 
attributions of knowledge. And then again, in the whole world, barns may outnumber 
facades by a large margin. So considered with respect to that reference class, the capacity 
would once again count as reliable. And so on. (Brandom (2000, 115-6)) 
       The problem can be pressed in the other direction: if a narrow reference class is 
considered, such as the environment containing the agent and the barn she happens to be 
looking at, the capacities she exercises in forming her belief that there is a barn would again 
count as reliable. In fact, they will count as maximally reliable, since the probability the agent 
will arrive at a true belief through the exercise of her capacities will now be 1. The problem 
for Greco, then, is that one has to decide what environment the agent is in—what the 
privileged spatio-temporal region around the agent is—in order to decide whether her 
																																																																																																																																																															
reference	class.	An	individual	thing	or	event	may	be	incorporated	in	many	reference	classes,	from	which	different	probabilities	will	
result.	This	ambiguity	has	been	called	the	problem	of	the	reference	class.	Reichenbach	(1949,	374).	 	
	
	
		
informational needs will be served in that environment. Nothing in Greco’s account picks 
out the privileged environment that would allow this process to begin. An important, 
though not commonly discussed, advantage of safety and sensitivity accounts is that they do 
precisely this. Safety and sensitivity conditions pick out a sphere of epistemic relevance (one 
whose size will vary drastically from case to case) and there is no reason at present to think 
that what constitutes an environment can be specified in a non-circular way without 
appealing to some such modal condition. Environment-relative analyses of knowledge 
which do not appeal to safety or sensitivity have a reference class problem, and in the absence of 
any reason to think they can solve this problem we ought to be wary any such account.11 
Yet, even if environments could be pinned down in a way that is both non-circular 
and makes no implicit appeal to distinct modal conditions, can Greco’s new analysis rule 
out knowledge-destroying epistemic luck? It seems not. The problem is with criterion 1. As 
Carter, Jarvis, and Rubin (Carter et al.) have argued, what constitutes an agent’s 
‘informational needs’ can vary from case to case in such a way that these informational 
needs can, in the right sorts of conditions, be served even when the agent’s belief-forming 
method is highly unreliable. Importantly, Greco’s analysis is pragmatic in character: 
‘informational needs’ is understood as picking out that information which is required for 
successful action. The problem is that there are many cases in which successful action does 
not require high levels of reliability with respect to belief. One particularly problematic set 
of cases involves scenarios in which there are high costs associated with not acting, but low 
costs associated with acting on false information. For creatures who are potential prey, 
																																																						
11	 It	should	be	clear	that	this	reference	class	problem	is	distinct	from	the	generality	problem	that	pertains	to	belief	forming	(see	
Goldman	(1979),	Feldman	(1995),	Conee	and	Feldman	(1998)).	That	problem	becomes	apparent	when	one	notices	that	a	belief	
forming	process	is	a	token	of	many	different	belief	forming	process	types,	and	some	principled	way	of	picking	out	the	relevant	type	
is	required.	A	solution	to	the	generality	problem	will	not	supply	a	solution	to	the	reference	class	problem	for	environment-relative	
		
belief-forming faculties that generate a high number of false positives of ‘There is a 
predator in my local environment’ may serve the informational needs of the creatures well, 
so long as they consistently bring about actions that keep the prey out of harm’s way. 
Certain medical diagnostic abilities present similar sorts of cases. A disease X is lethal unless 
treated with drug Y, and there are no harmful side effects to taking Y. Patients who are 
diagnosed as suffering from X are administered Y. Here, an unreliable method of diagnosis 
which produced a high number of false positives but zero false negatives would be more 
conducive to successful action than a highly reliable method of diagnosis which produced 
some false negatives. The lesson here is that informational needs can be served by beliefs 
with very low levels of reliability. The problem could be fixed by going hybrid in the 
manner of Pritchard’s ALVE; appending an anti-luck condition to the virtue-theoretic 
account. This however would be at the cost of losing the RVE’s ability to explain the 
unique value of knowledge in terms of achievement. 
So, there are serious issues with Greco’s account. There are doubts as to whether it 
can avoid reference class problems, and, as it stands, it is incapable of ruling out epistemic 
luck. Further, even if the analysis could be further complicated to deal with these 
problems—and we see no reason to think it could—there is a more straightforward way of 
both defending RVE against Pritchard’s objection and ruling out epistemic luck. The 
approach offered below allows one to endorse the KA thesis, accept the plausible claim that 
the Barney case involves a cognitive achievement, and circumvent cases of epistemic luck 
that blight most robust virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge—all without introducing 
Pritchard’s independent modal condition. 
																																																																																																																																																															
reliabilist	accounts	such	as	Greco’s. 
		
 
2  Achievement Defined 
	
To see why there is a version of RVE that is not undermined by Pritchard’s 
objection, we need to unpack the notion of achievement. Pritchard argues that the kind of 
achievement associated with knowledge should be understood in terms of primary credit: 
 
 (P) Achievements are successes from ability that are primarily creditable to the     
  agent.12  
 
(P) is meant to capture the idea that a genuine achievement is one where the success comes 
about  because of the relevant abilities of the agent.13 Note, there is good reason for spelling 
out achievements in this way. The notion of achievements as primarily creditable to the 
agent—hereafter, achievements (pc)—is critical to the KA thesis as it provides a solution to 
standard Gettier-style cases.14 The Barney case, however, is not a standard Gettier-style 
case. The difference in this example is that Barney does in fact observe an actual barn; and, 
it seems anyway, that he forms the true belief  because of his cognitive abilities. 15  As 
Pritchard argues, ‘Barney’s cognitive success is because of his cognitive ability and so we 
																																																						
12	 Pritchard	(2010,	41-42).	It’s	important	to	note	that	Pritchard	offers	this	definition	in	the	course	of	describing	the	notion	of	
achievement	made	use	of	in	RVE.	Pritchard’s	ALVE	only	requires	a	modest	ability	condition	and	rejects	the	primary	credit	
requirement.	RVE,	however,	is	not	in	a	position	to	reject	primary	credit	given	the	advantages	it	has	on	circumventing	Gettier-type	
problems,	such	as	the	Barney	case.	  
13	 Here	we	use	‘success	from	ability’	and	‘success	because	of	ability’	synonymously. 
14	 Chisholm’s	sheep	case,	for	example,	is	a	more	standard	Gettier	case.	See	Chisholm	(1977,	105).	In	this	standard	case,	then,	the	
agent	forms	the	belief	that	there	is	a	sheep	in	the	field	by	looking	at	a	dog	disguised	as	a	sheep.	There	is,	however,	a	sheep	just	out	
of	view.	While	the	belief	that	‘there	is	a	sheep	in	the	field’	is	in	fact	true,	the	true	belief	is	not	primarily	creditable	to	the	agent.	In	
Pritchard’s	words,	it	is	not	primarily	creditable	“in	the	sense	that	it	is	to	some	substantive	degree	down	to	her	agency	that	she	
holds	a	true	belief.”	Pritchard	(2010,	40). 
15	 In	the	end,	we	reject	Pritchard’s	claim	that	Barney	forms	the	true	belief	because	of	his	cognitive	abilities	(where	this	notion	
implies	primary	credit).	While	Barney	does	display	some	cognitive	abilities,	he	is	not	primarily	creditable	in	this	instance.	More	on	
this	below. 
		
would, therefore, attribute a cognitive achievement to Barney. That is, his cognitive success 
in this case is primarily creditable to his cognitive abilities.’16 
There are two related questions that need to be answered if we are to respond to 
Pritchard. First, are all genuine achievements captured by (P)? Put another way, does 
success from ability entail primary credit? As noted above, there is good reason for RVE to 
maintain the relationship between a genuine achievement and primary credit. This explains 
why Greco’s response to the Barney case is to deny that it is a representative case of success 
from ability (i.e., a genuine achievement). If there is no success from ability, there is no 
genuine cognitive achievement (pc) . Given the noted advantages, then, RVE is wise to insist 
on the relationship between genuine achievement and primary credit. The problem with this 
move is that failing to recognize Barney-type cases as genuine achievements is 
counterintuitive—Barney’s gaining a true belief through the exercise of his cognitive 
abilities does seem to be an achievement of some sort—and, as we saw, still isn’t sufficient to 
rule out epistemic luck. 
Our suggestion is for RVE is to take Pritchard’s analogy seriously and concede that 
Barney-type cases do represent success from ability. This concession, however, does not 
necessitate any independent anti-luck condition as Pritchard suggests. The reason for this is 
that one ought to distinguish mere achievement or achievement simpliciter from 
achievement (pc) . Both kinds of achievement are successes from ability, but only the latter is 
an achievement that is primarily creditable to the agent. We argue that RVE is only 
committed to the latter. It’s not an achievement simpliciter which motivates RVE, but 
achievement (pc) . As such, it is not the case that all achievements are captured by (P): 
																																																						
16	 Pritchard	(2010,	51). 
		
achievements (pc)  form a special subset of achievements simpliciter, and only achievements (pc)  
can account for the distinctive value of knowledge. 
Given that the Barney case involves a cognitive achievement of some kind, the 
second question is whether it involves an achievement (pc) . We will contend that it does not, 
and hence does not constitute the kind of achievement characterised by (P). An initial 
problem in addressing this question however is that we do not yet have a clear 
understanding of what it means for an achievement to be primarily creditable to an agent. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the Barney case does represent an achievement (pc) , we 
need to be clear on what (P) entails. Once we have a working definition of primary credit, 
the ramifications it has for Pritchard’s argument become clear—namely, that the Barney 
case does not represent an achievement (pc)  and the KA thesis is not undermined by 
Pritchard’s objection. 
 
3  The Entanglement Thesis 
 
We are working with a specific notion of achievement in which achievements are 
successes from ability that are primarily creditable to the agent; achievement (pc)  as opposed 
to achievement simpliciter. The distinction is important because achievement (pc) , we argue, 
entails sensitivity. This can be seen in the following way. The idea of primary 
creditworthiness, as we understand it, is supposed to capture the thought, intuitively put, 
that the achievement is down to the agent. In the case of belief this means that getting it right, 
rather than getting it wrong, is attributable to the activities of the agent herself, and not the 
		
collusion of factors outside of her activities. That is to say, the agent’s belief-forming 
methods are what ‘pin down’ the correctness of the belief. In those cases in which getting it 
right is attributable to the agent and her activities, the agent is able to discriminate between 
the truth and falsity of the target proposition.17 This is a point we will return to shortly, but, 
in the meantime, if this is not clear, take the (logically equivalent) contrapositive: if an agent 
is unable to discriminate between truth and falsity of the target proposition then her getting 
it right cannot be primarily attributable to her activities. She is only primarily creditable for 
gaining a true belief when her activities are what pin down the correctness of the belief. An 
agent then is primarily creditworthy—at least as we understand the phrase here—only if her 
activities secure her ability to discriminate between truth and falsity in the target case. With 
respect to belief-formation, this is captured by the following principle: 
 
 (*) S deserves to be attributed primary credit for forming a true belief that p, qua    
 true belief, only if S’s method of belief-formation is able to discriminate between it  
 being the case that p and it not being the case that p.18  
 
From here, it is only a short step from seeing that primary creditworthiness for getting a 
belief right has specific modal implications. If one can discriminate between the truth or 
falsehood of the proposition that p by exercising a particular belief-forming method, then, 
were one to come to believe that p by that method, one would also fail to believe that p in 
																																																						
17	 Interestingly,	Greco	(2011,	229)	himself	recognizes	the	connection	between	success	from	ability	and	the	agent’s	ability	to	
discriminate	between	p	and	¬p.	Greco,	though,	fails	to	note	the	link	between	discrimination	and	sensitivity.	We	discuss	this	in	more	
detail	below. 
18	 There	is	a	general	worry	here	about	credit	and	testimony	that	has	been	discussed	at	length	in	the	literature.	We	won’t	consider	
this	objection	here,	but	the	reader	should	note	Jennifer	Lackey’s	important	paper	Lackey	(2007)	on	this	topic.	Lackey	argues	that	in	
cases	of	testimony	you	get	knowledge	without	achievement	(testimonial	knowledge	is	too	easy	for	the	agent	to	get	credit	for	the	
true	belief).	For	a	response	to	Lackey,	and	one	that	we	think	is	generally	right,	see	Wayne	Riggs	(2009). 
		
the closest possible world in which it is not the case that p. This is the sensitivity principle: 
 
 Sensitivity: S’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if, were that p false, S would  
 not believe that p via the method S actually uses in forming the belief that p.19  
 
In fact, one of the most attractive features of the sensitivity principle is that it preserves the 
strong intuition that knowledge of some proposition that p requires the ability to 
discriminate or distinguish between it being the case that p and it not being the case that p. 
For Nozick, this was a fundamental reason to endorse sensitivity. For Nozick, and 
contemporary proponents of sensitivity such as Becker, the discrimination requirement has 
important implications for how methods must be understood in the sensitivity principle. If 
we follow Tim Black (2002) in individuating methods externally, by the external causes of 
belief, then the discrimination requirement is not satisfied. We can see this in the case of 
BIVs. If external causes are counted within the method, then one’s belief that one is not a 
BIV is sensitive, because, were one a BIV, one’s external causes of belief would be different. 
What Nozick and Becker settle on is an internalist characterisation of methods which still 
respects the externalist nature of the sensitivity principle: 
 
 Sensitivity: S’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if, were that p false, S would  
 not believe that p via the method n  S actually uses in forming the belief that p.  
 
The subscripted ‘n’ appended to ‘method’ indicates that methods are to be individuated 
																																																						
19	 See	Dretske	(1970)	and	Nozick	(1981)	for	early	presentations	of	sensitivity	principles,	and	Becker	(2007)	for	a	recent	
		
narrowly and in a content-specific way. More specifically, Becker says: 
 
 [M]ethods should be individuated by reference to the specific upshot in the agent’s     
 experience. That is, which method an agent uses depends on how things strike her,   
 and the method should be individuated maximally specifically, in the sense that any   
 feature of how things strike the agent that is causally relevant to belief production  
 ought to be counted as part of the method. (Becker 2012: 91)  
 
An example of this might be: If you seem to see a hairy, ursine creature with claws, an 
elongated snout etc. then conclude that there is a bear before you. Though it’s not our goal to defend 
sensitivity here, two points about the nature of methods n  are briefly worth noting. The 
first is that Becker is appealing to the content of one’s experience in order to parse methods 
(this is what Becker means above by ‘the specific upshot in the agent’s experience’). But 
‘contents’ here are understood as non-propositional contents, in order to avoid 
epistemological internalism. The second point is that this really is an externalist view. 
Methods are not (or need not be) propositional justifiers since the ‘upshot in the agent’s 
experience’ need not be understood propositionally. Moreover, the method may not be 
something the agent himself fully understands and can articulate, or for that matter is even 
aware of. As such, Becker’s sensitivity principle is authentically externalist, whilst retaining 
the attractive and plausible idea that knowledge requires a discriminative capacity. The link 
between discrimination and sensitivity (at least, this form of sensitivity) then is not 
controversial. Not only does discrimination entail Becker’s version of sensitivity, this 
																																																																																																																																																															
method-relative	formulation	of	the	principle,	with	a	discussion	of	how	to	expound	the	notion	of	a	method. 
		
version of sensitivity was designed for precisely that purpose. The ability to discriminate 
entails that one’s methods be sensitive in the Becker way (or something very close to it). 
Let’s return for a moment to something we briefly discussed above: the link 
between primary credit and discrimination. First, we are not alone in recognizing this 
connection; Greco has himself noted that: 
 
 [R]elative to Barn Façade County, Barney does not have the ability to perceptually    
 discriminate barns from non-barns. And if he does not have the ability relative to  
 that environment, then his success in that environment is not from ability. (Greco  
 2011: 229)20  
 
Greco’s claim then is that if Barney does not have the ability [to perceptually 
discriminate barns from non-barns] relative to that environment, then his success is not 
from ability. And this is the (logically equivalent) contrapositive of our own claim: that if 
Barney’s success is from ability, then Barney does have the ability [to perceptually 
discriminate barns from non-barns] relative to that environment. We are in agreement with 
Greco here. If S merits primary credit for arriving at a true belief – if arriving at a true belief 
is a success from S’s abilities – then S must be responsible for her belief being correct; S’s 
belief-forming methods must be what pin down the correctness of the belief. Consider the 
following example: 
 
S is taking part in a music quiz, where extracts from the compositions of classical 
																																																						
20	 See	also	Greco	(2010,	76):	‘Henry	does	not	have	the	ability	to	tell	barns	from	non-barns	relative	to	the	environment	he	is	in.	
Relative	to	normal	environments,	we	may	assume	that	Henry	can	perfectly	well	discriminate	between	barns	and	non-barns.	
		
composers are played, and S is trying to correctly identify which composer wrote 
which composition. When S hears polyphonic choral music, S uses the following 
belief-forming method: If you seem to hear polyphonic choral music then conclude that you are 
hearing Rachmaninoff. The quizmaster is picking between Rachmaninoff, Tallis and 
Palestrina. S hears an extract from Rachmaninoff’s Liturgy of St John Chrysostom, 
forms the belief that the composition is by Rachmaninoff, and answers correctly.  
 
What is at stake is whether S could be primarily creditable for winning a point in the 
quiz despite not being able to distinguish between the composition being by Rachmaninoff 
or not. It is clearly wrong in this case to say that S deserves primary credit for getting it 
right, or that the achievement in this case is down to the activities of S, or that S primarily 
merits a correct answer in this case, or other cognate claims. 
Let’s recap. The first main point here is that if S is primarily creditable for correctly 
believing that p then S is responsible for the correctness of her belief that p. This is simply 
true in virtue of what we mean by ‘primary credit’. The second main point is that if S is 
unable to discriminate between it being the case that p and it not being the case that p then 
S is not responsible for the correctness of her belief that p. It is not S’s method that pins 
down the correctness of her belief that p, and one is not responsible for that which is 
outwith one’s auspices. But note that this second point is logically equivalent to ‘If S is 
responsible for the correctness of her belief that p, then S is able to discriminate between it 
being the case that p and it not being the case that p’. Here, then, is a clear and simple line 
of argument from primary credit to discrimination: 
																																																																																																																																																															
Relative	to	Fake	Barn	Country,	however,	Henry	does	not	have	that	ability.’ 
		
  
    1.  S is primarily creditable for correctly believing that p. [premise]  
    2.  If S is primarily creditable for correctly believing that p then S is responsible for the       
        correctness of her belief that p. [premise]  
    3.  S is responsible for the correctness of her belief that p. [1, 2, MP]  
    4.  If S is responsible for the correctness of her belief that p, then S is able to    
discriminate between it being the case that p and it not being the case that p.  
[premise]  
    5.  S is able to discriminate between it being the case that p and it not being the case  
        that p. [3, 4, MP]  
 
As we have seen the ability to discriminate between it being the case that p and it 
not being the case that p entails Becker’s method-relative form of sensitivity. Hence there is 
an important but neglected relationship between virtue-theoretic and modal properties, in 
particular primary creditability entails a particular form of method-relative sensitivity. 
 This is an entanglement thesis: the normative features of knowledge are entangled with 
the modal features of knowledge; the modal character of knowledge is a result of its 
normative character. This entanglement thesis is not the important but relatively vanilla 
observation that virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge have some modal implications, but 
the recognition that virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge which make use of (P) entail a 
very specific and theoretically powerful (if controversial) modal condition on knowledge. 
Accordingly, in order for an agent to have a true belief that is primarily creditable to her, it 
needs to be the case that the belief is sensitive. And in Barney-type cases, the belief is clearly 
		
not sensitive. Put simply, Barney does not have the ability to discriminate between p and 
¬p. Thus, Barney does not have a sensitive true belief that is the result of his cognitive 
ability and, as a result, the Barney case is not an achievement (pc) . The KA thesis is not 
undermined by Pritchard’s objection. 
 
4  Sensitivity 
 
There is then a point in logical space which allows for an robustly virtue-theoretic 
account of knowledge which deals with epistemic luck via the sensitivity condition. This 
account will, of course, differ from both Greco’s and Pritchard’s since they incorporate (or 
attempt to incorporate), in their own different ways, a safety condition into their accounts 
of knowledge.21 Is this a problem? In answering this question, it’s important to note that 
any successful account of knowledge needs to describe the sense in which knowledge 
excludes epistemic luck. With respect to this task, the two major games in town are safety 
and sensitivity. And while both safety and sensitivity are ongoing and interesting research 
programmes with powerful explanatory resources, each faces a number of objections. 
Taking just some of the most prominent of these, both safety and sensitivity have been 
criticised on the grounds that they lead to closure failure—Kvanvig (2004, 2008), Murphy 
(2005) and Alspector Kelly (2011) all argue that safety leads to closure failure, whilst Nozick 
																																																						
21	 A	version	of	the	safety	principle	was	first	given	by	Luper	(1984),	though	it	is	more	commonly	associated	Sosa	(1999)	who	parsed	
the	condition	as	‘a	belief	by	S	that	p	[is	safe]	iff:	S	would	believe	that	p	only	if	it	were	so	that	p’	(142).	More	recently,	Pritchard	
(2007,	2008)	has	endorsed	the	more	sophisticated	formulation:	
	
Safety:	S’s	belief	is	safe	if	and	only	if	in	most	nearby	possible	worlds	in	which	S	continues	to	form	her	belief	about	the	
target	proposition	in	the	same	way	as	in	the	actual	world,	and	in	all	very	close	nearby	possible	worlds	in	which	S	
continues	to	form	her	belief	about	the	target	proposition	in	the	same	way	as	in	the	actual	world,	the	belief	continues	to	
be	true.	 	
 
		
(1981) held that his sensitivity condition violated the standard closure principle but upheld a 
more plausible finessed closure principle.22 Bernecker (2012) on the other hand, argues that 
sensitivity does not violate closure, and and Black (2002, 2008) formulates a version of the 
sensitivity principle in which methods are individuated externally, so that closure is 
maintained. 23  Comesaña (2005), Baumann (2008), Kelp (2009), Bogardus (2014) and 
Bogardus and Marxen (2013) all claim that there are instances where knowledge isn’t safe; 
Sosa (1999) and Vogel (2007), on the other hand, claim that there can be insensitive 
knowledge (though see Becker (2012) for a response to Sosa and Cross (2007) for a 
response to Vogel). McEvoy (2009) and Dodd (2012) have also argued that safety cannot 
handle lottery cases. 
As one can see, then, the issues surrounding safety and sensitivity are ongoing. And 
defending sensitivity principles against all the objections leveled against them is beyond the 
scope of this paper (or, for that matter, any single paper). 24  Like any active research 
programme, and like its cousin safety, it will be subject to a number of criticisms and a 
number of attempts to circumvent these criticisms, or otherwise show that they are 
unfounded. Our approach to the sensitivity condition itself is modest: whether it stands at 
the end of inquiry is not something to be settled here. What we do claim however is that our 
proposal has a unique advantage over its competitors in that it is both robustly 
virtue-theoretic and anti-luck; and, moreover, that sensitivity should at the very least be kept 
on the table, as a going concern, and is not obviously subject to knock-down objections. It 
																																																						
22	 See	Baumann	(2012)	for	discussion	and	for	an	argument	that	the	standard	closure	principle	licenses	bootstrap-ping	and	should	
be	rejected. 
23	 Perhaps	for	sociological,	rather	than	philosophical	reasons,	closure	failure	is	widely	perceived	to	be	a	problem	for	sensitivity	
alone.	This	perception	is	not	reflected	in	the	work	carried	out	in	this	area. 
24	 Though	we	do	not	deal	with	objections	to	sensitivity	here,	we	do	offer	a	positive	defense.	We	note,	for	example,	the	particular	
advantages	sensitivity	has	over	safety	with	respect	to	the	value	problem.	This	is	consistent	with	a	central	aim	of	the	paper–to	note	
the	connection	between	sensitivity	and	virtue	epistemology.	In	the	end,	the	claim	regarding	sensitivity	is	merely	conditional. 
		
is, in other words, a live research option. As a result, the sensitive virtue epistemology we 
have described here is a legitimate rival to standard RVE and ALVE accounts. 
 
5  The Benefits of a Sensitive Virtue Epistemology 
 
There is good reason to explicate knowledge in terms of primary creditworthiness, 
since doing so, as was noted above, both addresses standard Gettier problems and provides 
an attractive response to the value problem. Doing so also, we claim, vindicates our 
contention from section 1. One can hold that the Barney case is a cognitive achievement, 
but because it is not the sort of cognitive achievement relevant to knowledge it is not 
impacted by Pritchard’s worry. Furthermore, primary creditworthiness entails sensitivity, so 
robust virtue epistemologists who explicate their account of knowledge in terms of primary 
creditworthiness must endorse sensitivity if they are to avoid incoherence. The result of this 
is that this robust virtue-theoretic account has anti-luck credentials built-in. Neither Barney 
cases nor, yet trickier, epistemic twin earth cases25 will cause special problems for this 
account that are not faced by analyses of knowledge that include independent modal 
anti-luck conditions. This gives the preceding account distinct advantages over other robust 
virtue theoretic accounts and hybrid virtue-theoretic, anti-luck accounts. The former can 
endorse the KA thesis, but are subject to counterexamples involving epistemic luck, whilst 
the latter avoid these counterexamples at the cost of abandoning the KA thesis. No such 
choice need be made here. 
Two other claims follow from the entanglement thesis. The first is irenic: Pritchard 
																																																						
25	 Cf.	Kallestrup	and	Pritchard	(2012). 
		
and the robust virtue epistemologist are not so far apart as one may have supposed. 
Pritchard conjoins a virtue-theoretic condition with an ‘independent’ modal anti-luck 
condition to forge his account of knowledge. We claim, on the other hand, that at least one 
virtue-theoretic condition entails a modal anti-luck condition. This is to the good, since 
unless robust virtue epistemologists simply deny that knowledge is incompatible with veritic 
luck, they must endorse an anti-luck condition, whether it is made explicit or is implicit in 
their preferred virtue-theoretic conditions.26  The second, related, claim is that, whilst the 
virtue theoretic account of knowledge is not subject to the criticism discussed here, it is also 
a larger target than virtue-theoretic epistemologists might have realised: given its entailment 
of sensitivity, objections to sensitivity are, by that fact, objections to the virtue-theoretic 
account. Some epistemologists will see an entailment of sensitivity as a perquisite, others 
will not; but as we noted earlier, sensitivity, like safety, is research programme worth 
pursuing. As a result, there is a place in logical space for a RVE epistemology with the 
benefits, but not the drawbacks, of Greco’s account, and the benefits, but not the 
drawbacks, of Pritchard’s hybrid ALVE. A final feature of this account deserves note. As 
Pritchard (2012) has emphasized, two intuitions govern our thinking about knowledge. One 
is an anti-luck intuition: in cases of knowledge, the truth of one’s belief cannot just be a 
matter of luck. This is why Gettier, and cognate, cases do not constitute knowledge.  
The second intuition is that in cases of knowledge, the cognitive success at hand is the 
product of cognitive abilities. There Pritchard contends that these two intuitions are 
disjoint. Our account draws the opposite conclusion; that there is a deep theoretical unity 
between the normative and the modal aspects of knowledge. That a sensitive virtue 
																																																						
26	 Irenic,	but	not	utterly	ecumenical,	since	Pritchard	rejects	the	sensitivity	condition	in	favor	of	safety	(Pritchard	(2005)).	
		
epistemology has this unifying explanatory power is a uniquely attractive feature. 
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